THE ARSENAL

Augusta University's Undergraduate Research Journal

ISSN 2380-5064 | Arsenal is published by the Augusta University Libraries | <http://guides.augusta.edu/arsenal>

Volume 2, Issue 1 (2018)

Civilizing with a Krag: U.S. Counter-Insurgency in Vietnam and Iraq

George Ritchie

Citation

Ritchie, G. (2018). Civilizing with a Krag: U.S. Counter-Insurgency in Vietnam and Iraq. *Arsenal: The undergraduate research journal of Augusta University*, 2(1), 1-20.
<http://doi.org/10.21633/issn.2380.5064/s.2018.02.01>

© Ritchie 2018. This open access article is distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution NonCommercial-NoDerivs 2.0 Generic License
(<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/>)

Civilizing with a Krag: Counter-Insurgency in Vietnam and Iraq

George Ritchie

Department of Social Sciences

Faculty Mentor: Lance Hunter, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Political Science

ABSTRACT This thesis¹ examines and compares the effects of counter-insurgency operations in Vietnam and Iraq. It argues that the populous focused approach that centers on the hearts and minds of the locals is more beneficial and effective than conventional strategies. To support this thesis, research has been conducted on the United States' history with counter-insurgency operations in Vietnam. This includes conventional tactics of the United States Army designed for war with the Soviets and the United States Marine Corps experiments with the Combined Action Platoon. These cases have been compared to the effectiveness of combating the insurgency in Iraq from the 2003 invasion to 2010, examining the resurgence of people-oriented programs such as the Combined Action Platoon compared to the conventional fighting waged early war. Study of these conflicts remains relevant due to the new administration's promises of action against insurgent groups worldwide. The ability of successful counter-insurgency to be implemented on a large scale with minor variation is also explored. Links should be drawn from past US involvement with insurgency to present due to the similarities in successful and unsuccessful attempts both past and present.

Keywords: Vietnam, Iraq, Counterinsurgency, Marine Corps

¹ Originally submitted as an Honors Thesis for the Augusta University Honors Program

Received: 03/30/2018 Accepted: 06/13/2018

Correspondence: George Ritchie, Augusta University, 1120 15th St. Augusta, GA 30912,
gritchie@augusta.edu

INTRODUCTION

The United States has had a varied history with the fighting of asymmetric conflicts. From as early as King Phillips War as well as on to the Philippine Insurrection and the Banana Wars, the U.S. has been engaged with irregular forces using unconventional tactics. However, two such wars stand out among the rest and have fundamentally impacted the U.S. military. Both Vietnam and Iraq have similarities in the strategies and tactics used to fight insurgent forces. Such forces are those that hide among the population, causing confusion and mistrust between the locals and the military, and fighting a war of attrition. Both conflicts showed a contrast of ideas on how to ultimately win.

To fight insurgencies, two methods can be utilized, conventional and unconventional approaches. Conventional approaches are designed to fight other armies, decisive strikes against enemies to bring them in to one large battle, and the use of air power to deny enemy assets. Unconventional approaches focus on fighting the small war, the one that keeps in mind the role the locals play in the ebb and flow of an insurgency. This focus includes interacting with local leaders, building good reputations, and eliminating incentive to join the fight. Vietnam and Iraq had both approaches occurring simultaneously among different regions and different branches, and the results were clear that the unconventional approach was more successful at promoting peace and stability.

Thus, further expansion of this counter-insurgency doctrine, one that focuses on the Hearts and Minds of the local population, is necessary should the United States continue fighting insurgent forces. To evince this belief, the effects of counter-insurgency operations in both Iraq and Vietnam will be examined and compared for success in eliminating the insurgent threat. Specifically, the use of strategies such as the Combined Action Program will be studied in both conflicts, as well as the more conventional strategies used by other forces, such as vehicular patrols and the extensive use of air power. This examination will provide insight into the strategies used in the conflicts of Vietnam ranging from 1961-1975 and Iraq from 2003 till 2010.

It must be noted that there is a difference between the terms of terrorism and insurgency, which translates to the difference between counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism. Terrorism is often conducted using methods outside of what is acceptable behavior from political groups or states, often through extreme violence. Insurgency is different in that it focuses on deeper issues than what is perceived as terror, society comes into play (Kilcullen 2009). Rather than a simple law enforcement or right to protect issue, counter-insurgency becomes a struggle for the support of the population (Kilcullen,

2009). Because of the deeper connotations of insurgency, it is more acceptable than terrorism in the eyes of the world despite some of the same methods being used. As such, political figures often confuse the two, which heavily influences some of the political stances and actions taken. Indeed, even the global counter-insurgency efforts since September 11 have been affected by this paradigm through the unofficial title of “The War on Terror.” The lack of clear definition has led to the strategic search for the right methods to use, when these methods and goals should have been decided before action had been taken. For the purposes of this paper, and since the actions and societal players match closely, The War on Terror is at heart a counter-insurgency effort, and as such, methods used will be based on this understanding.

The research question for this thesis asks what the best counter-insurgency strategy is based on previous U.S. experience in Iraq and Vietnam. This paper examines pacification, the direct approach, and the indirect approach of Hearts and Minds. I argue that Hearts and Minds is the most effective way to use a conventional force to fight an unconventional enemy. I base this belief on the previous success of the strategy in both Vietnam and Iraq, as opposed to the long and drawn out methods utilized by forces with a more conventional mentality which were also used in these conflicts. A counter argument may be made that such a strategy is only effective in certain regions and cultures, and that U.S. involvement has shifted in both cases over time. As regional cases will only be used in these specific conflicts, this is a restriction to my research regarding generalizability.

VIETNAM 1961-1975

The United States has had history with unconventional conflict. These conflicts did help to set up the future of a Hearts and Minds approach for use in later interventions. Since the conflicts were small scale and overseas, the main forces used were those of the United States Marine Corps (Cassidy, 2004). This experience through the Philippine Insurrection and the multiple conflicts in Latin America, comprising the Banana Wars, helped to build a heritage of counter-insurgency warfare. While involved in these conflicts, the Marines took the time to interact with the local population in a positive way, train local forces, and limit incentive to fight U.S. forces through good relations (Weltsch, 1991). The Marines had another advantage to the understanding of counter-insurgency warfare as well, the translation of Mao Zedong’s *On Guerrilla Warfare* by Marine General Samuel B. Griffith. The book, a guide on insurgent operations against established governments and conventional forces, allowed the Marine Corps insight into the mind of their enemies in Vietnam, and proved an effective tool in planning against the forces of the Viet Cong, the insurgent Vietnamese group that operated in South Vietnam and Cambodia (Zedong, 2015).

These factors contributed heavily to the Marine Corps use of a Hearts and Minds indirect approach through the creation and implementation of the Combined Action Program by Major General Lew Walt, based on his experiences in Nicaragua (Nagl, 2002). This program involved the clearing and holding of populated areas, such as hamlets and villages, defending them from low intensity attacks, training of local forces, and the performance of trust building between the Marines and the locals through civic actions utilizing this history of small warfare (Kopets, 2005). These platoons were coordinated by a council of regional civilian government heads, Marine commanders, as well as a representative from the Republic of Vietnam (Nagl, 2002). Conventional operations could still be conducted against Viet Cong with intelligence from higher units, as well as from the villagers who would come to trust and rely on U.S. forces.

Success was measured based on the secure roads and hamlets, rather than by body counts, and as such was harder to quantify by Marine commanders, drawing skepticism from their Army counterparts (Nagl, 2002). Lieutenant General Krulak of the U.S.M.C defended this by stating that “if their killing is accompanied by devastation of friendly areas, we may end up having done more harm than good” (Sheehan, 1989). As the program grew, schools teaching local language and culture prior to integration were created, which helped the relationship between Marines and the nationals. Positive results were produced by the program, and the number of communist controlled villages increased in 1967 in all areas except those under the CAP (Nagl, 2002). Despite its relative success, the program was looked down upon by other forces still fighting a conventional war, and was often ignored (Ford, 1996).

Another indirect approach that was utilized to success within the Vietnam War was the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS). This program was developed out of several CIA programs, and was the brainchild of Robert Komer of the National Security Council (Nagl, 2002). Consisting of civilian government officials of the U.S. and South Vietnam, as well as military elements, CORDS focused on achieving solutions at all levels (Nagl, 2002). Both civilian and military efforts would go into gaining local support from the civilians of South Vietnam through local security and regional forces led by U.S. advisers. The gains made by CORDS improved regional security immensely and helped integrate the governments of South Vietnam and the U.S. (Record & Terrill, 2004). Another key facet of CORDS was its ability to adapt to situations rather than focus on the rigidity of established organizations. Despite its efforts and success, CORDS was not given serious consideration until after the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam, at which point its progress had eroded and no resources were able to be allocated (Komer, 1970).

Another important force in the unconventional lean towards counter-insurgency was President John F. Kennedy. With a greater understanding than previous leadership on the

necessities of changing tactics to meet this different threat, Kennedy challenged U.S. Army leadership to adapt to the conditions in South Vietnam (Nagl, 2002). Kennedy emphasized Special Forces, as well as creating the Special Group for counter-insurgency to analyze the information he was getting from military sources (Nagl, 2002). The Army was skeptical of Kennedy's insistence on focusing on approaches such as Hearts and Minds and were convinced that to retrain the officers and men would be detrimental to future operations, as well as convoluted due to lack of clear doctrine (Doughty, 1979). What changes were made by the Army focused on the tactical level, and were much the same as the conventional doctrine already in use. With the assassination of Kennedy, much of the small gains in counter-insurgency doctrine would be lost, as there were no real upper level proponents.

The majority of the United States Army, despite these programs having a positive impact in Vietnam, were not supportive of such counter-insurgency methods (Walt, 1970). The Army had been built from the ground up to fight conventional conflicts, particularly against the Soviet Union. Its training to fight conventional conflicts was excellent, and the prevailing thought was that any war could be won through the enemy's destruction, so long as the enemy was found (Nagl, 2002). The system, as shown with Kennedy, was resistant to change, based on the belief that all types of conflicts could be fought on a conventional level despite increased insurgent attacks showing the inadequacy of the then current methods. The main strategy was to harm the enemy across their full spectrum and bring about negotiations, as with all direct action conventional fighting (Westmoreland, 1976). One senior Army officer stated, "I'll be damned if I permit the United States Army, its institutions, its doctrine, and its traditions to be destroyed just to win this lousy war" (Jenkins, 1972).

Conventional operations were used against the North Vietnamese Army with success, and when dealing with the Viet Cong it was thought the same methods could be used. However, the attempt to search for and destroy the Viet Cong was often fruitless, and did not result in decisive battles as sought by the Army (Ford, 1996). Territory would be fought for and taken, but then reoccupied by insurgent forces as soon as the Army left, thus little progress was made. This drive to take the offensive by the U.S. Army was explained by General Westmoreland: "Base camps established, all units were constantly on the offensive, seeking any enemy that might be encountered... As often as not, the enemy was not found" (1976). Conversely, insurgent forces were able to move into striking positions of U.S. forces with the help of the local population, which was alienated from U.S. forces due to lack of outreach (Karnow, 1997).

The conventional warfare mindset did not stop with the U.S. Army, and much of the training the Army of the Republic of Vietnam got was of the conventional type (Nagl, 2002). The ARVN was built as a mirror institution to the U.S. Army, and due to its

training and inexperience, were inflexible to the needs of counter-insurgency. Their training was often interrupted by pacification missions that were the result of failed counter-insurgency practices to begin with (Nagl, 2002). Despite their ineffective efforts at counter-insurgency due to this, President Diem, the leader of the Republic of Vietnam, was an avid proponent of conventional style training, despite its decreasing relevance when fighting the Vietcong (Nagl, 2002). These early advisory failures helped contribute to the growing insurgency in the South, as well as a steady source of captured weapons from the hands of ill-trained and poorly lead troops (Nagl, 2002).

The use of air power through the Air Force was utilized extensively as well, as it would against a conventional force. While ground support actions were performed by Airmen, these were often confined to specific battles or engagements with mixed success due to the available technology. The one conventional strategy not used extensively until later in the war was the strategic bombing of North Vietnam, and it is debated whether its use would have forced capitulation of North Vietnam, or put a stop to insurgent actions in the south. The lack of this strategy is due in part to the fragile political situation of the Cold War. The U.S. did not want to commit to actions that would threaten the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. At the time, it was thought that more troops would have a more lasting impact on the course of the war (Karnow, 1997). This belief in the use of overwhelming firepower and large formations to eliminate conventional forces was not conducive to successful operations against insurgencies, and failed to be effective against the Viet Cong's power in South Vietnam due to its insistence that pacification of enemy forces was the only way to deal with insurgencies (United States, 1971).

In a point of irony, despite the best efforts of the U.S. to allow the insurgency to fester in South Vietnam through mishandling, the insurgency was effectively over by 1969 (Kilcullen, 2010). Through the attempts at various methods of counter-insurgency by the U.S. as well as the casualties sustained by the Vietcong by the communist's Tet Offensive, the communist forces in South Vietnam were unable to accomplish their goal of toppling the Republic of Vietnam. This, in turn, spurred an invasion by North Vietnam following the withdrawal of U.S. troops (Record & Terrill, 2004). Despite the belief that the victory over the Vietcong's Tet Offensive was one validating the direct and conventional approach, the successes were only paved at the tactical level by the indirect programs such as the CAP, CORDS, the Strategic Hamlet Program, and the use of Special Forces as directed by Kennedy such as the Montagnard strikes which were focused on using local forces with U.S. advisors rather than conventional forces utilizing search and destroy tactics which included establishing and defending firebases, patrols, and fighting for locations that were tactically of little value. Additionally, should the U.S. have stayed and prevented an invasion by North Vietnam, the problem of the South Vietnam government would have made the regional and international political climate

unsteady, as Minh and his administration were a military junta that lacked cohesion after the U.S. backed overthrow of the previous president, Diem, who was oppressing the people (Nagl, 2002). The examination of these programs, as well as how the U.S. Army received them, is important as it influenced much of the counter-insurgency strategy in Iraq.

IRAQ 2003-2010

The U.S. invaded Iraq in the March of 2003 with the assurances of its intelligence agencies that chemical weapons were possessed by Saddam Hussein as well as his support of the terror groups that had been responsible for the September 11 attacks (Gordon & Trainor, 2006). The U.S. saw this invasion as an attempt at a regime change for the betterment of the region as well, much of George W. Bush's administration were heavily influenced by theory. The prevailing theory for the invasion was Democratic Peace Theory, democratic states have not gone to war with one another in modern times since World War One due to shared belief and fear of the costs of war. It was believed that should the Baathist regime be replaced with a democratically elected government, it would have proved a stepping stone to bring peace to the Middle East (Bush, 2006). To President Bush, it was not only an attack on Hussein and terrorism, but a "great ideological struggle, between extremists who use terror as a weapon to create fear, and moderate people," and would ultimately result in the growth of liberty for the people, tolerance, hope, and peace to grow regionally and globally (Bush, 2006). This is important to understand as it explains the eagerness to which the U.S. invaded, as well as the lack of end game once the new government was established which helped cultivate the insurgency.

The Iraqi counter-insurgency is unique in that it started as a conventional conflict and, with previous lessons and good decision-making, should not have been one so heavily involved in insurgency. The main actions taken by the U.S. government helped exasperate the insurgency even with changes to U.S. tactics on the ground, strengthening the case for overall counter-insurgency strategy and cooperation between military and government officials. These included disbanding the Iraqi Army and influencing the Iraqi elections (Gordon & Trainor, 2006). The U.S. forces, still built from the ground up to oppose the Soviets, eliminated the Republican Guard of Iraq with relatively few problems. The overwhelming power of conventional U.S. forces was unquestioned as it was in the early stages of Vietnam. However, after policies that created incentives to fight U.S. forces such as the firing of the Republican Guard and the barring of Baathists from political office, the second phase of the war, the Insurgency, started. Once again, the Army attempted to use conventional tactics to fight an unconventional force, while

the Marines and smaller elements of the Army resurrected programs such as the CAP.

Indicators that the War in Iraq would take a turn for the worse occurred early in the invasion. Despite anticipating welcoming locals who were oppressed by Saddam Hussein, invading forces were met with stiff resistance and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Foreign fighters and hit and run attacks were becoming more common as the Republican Guard faded away, both hallmarks of a low intensity conflict (Gordon & Trainor, 2006). While changes were made on the fly by those closest to the fighting, shaping the future of the conflict was not done until later by those in charge of strategic planning. Once the conventional fight against Saddam was over, the belief set in at these levels that the war was practically over, however the insurgency was beginning to escalate (Gordon & Trainor, 2006). The U.S. planners were so tied to their original plan to immediately replace U.S. troops with other coalition forces that the situation on the ground became worse, and measures that could have been taken were ignored. This became another situation in which the U.S. was without its planned international support, which was one of the key parts in shaping the invasion as one of an international act to restore peace. This plan was implemented while announcing that the invasion would be done with agility in mind and knowing that irregular forces like Osama Bin Laden were involved in the region (Gordon & Trainor, 2006).

The Hearts and Minds approach once again played a prominent role in the later stages of the Iraq war, with several different strategies put in place. The Combined Action Program made an appearance yet again with a focus on joint combat patrols. Its scope was left to regional commanders which contributed differences to its effects in Iraq. The program held the goals of security in Iraq, the building of relationships between U.S. forces and Iraqi security forces and civilians, and the training of Iraqi forces for the eventual drawdown of U.S. forces (Hickman, 2005). The efforts resulted in similar success as their Vietnam counterparts, with higher moral for Iraqi security forces, as well as efficient combined arms missions against insurgent forces and actionable intelligence provided by local civilians about insurgent activities. Much like the Vietnam counterpart, it was costly only in risk, manpower, and time, with no additional costs for equipment or aid (Hickman, 2005). The CAP was expanded and described as the “Four Component Partnering Model” which enforced the cooperation of the U.S. military, the local government, the local police, and the local military, no matter the size or objective of the operation (Kilcullen, 2010). This improved all four elements in their use, and enhanced the credibility and resources of operations the Marines partook in (Kilcullen, 2010).

A similar strategy was developed which centered on training rather than joint operations called the Military Transition Team. Focused on training Iraqi forces with small groups of embedded soldiers, it allowed Iraqi forces to take more responsibility in

defeating insurgent forces and gain experience, while U.S. forces were still present. This transition from fighting alongside Iraqi forces to acting as advisors was particularly sought as a way to draw down forces for the war (NATO, 2009). Along with this came the expansion of supporting elements that were necessary to ensure efficient indirect counter-insurgency operations, civil affairs and military police units. The realization that the battlespace was no longer about the physical enemy, but the people as well had started to set in in the later phases of the war. This realization shifted the focus from conventional attitude to the unconventional, the elements that supported insurgent activity, particularly the people (Ricks, 2006). Arguments were made to higher leadership by such units to limit the direct-action raids on suspected insurgent homes unless sufficient intelligence linking them was produced, the limitations of the use of heavy artillery to respond to mortar attacks, as well as more reparations to locals who had been wrongfully raided had led to decreased amounts of insurgent acts linked to slighted honor (Ricks, 2006).

In late 2004, the U.S. military on a large scale changed its posture on indirect counter-insurgency (Ricks, 2006). General Casey, the senior coalition commander at the time, produced a road map for future operations in Iraq, which was the first guided counter-insurgency strategy the U.S. had until that point. This guide outlined a strategy to contain violence, retraining the Iraqi army, reaching out to the local communities, and rebuilding the economic infrastructure of Iraq (Ricks, 2006). Additionally, a team of officers who had experience on the ground, as well as high academic credentials, was formed to continue to pursue counter-insurgency strategy for immediate implementation. Their product was a study of previous counter-insurgency campaigns that outlined what would be detrimental for future operations, which included some of the key facets of the U.S. campaign previously waged. From this point, U.S. efforts changed to avoid these pitfalls and introduce positive measures with beneficial results (Ricks, 2006). The most notable example is the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment's actions at Tall Afar, which was a mirror of Fallujah in all aspects except how the U.S. dealt with them. Instead of a conventional battle, 3rd ACR conducted a successful counter-insurgency campaign that resulted in a diminishing of insurgent activity, large amounts of recruitment into the Iraqi police, and an influx of intelligence about insurgent operations (Ricks, 2006). General Casey later instated the COIN Academy to help teach these lessons for future endeavors, and to help make counter-insurgency an institutional learning experience.

Another key strategy used during the Iraq War as a measure against the insurgency came with new leadership in the form of General Petraeus. His troop surge not only was an attempt to increase strength of U.S. forces in order to secure Baghdad and the Al Anbar Province, but also an attempt to repair the relationships with the Iraqi people

(Cave & Glanz, 2007). With a focus on protecting the people rather than killing insurgents, it marked a change from previous mentalities that were more conventional in nature (Kilcullen, 2009). Counterinsurgency strategy (COIN) saw cooperation between locals and U.S. forces as important in stemming the tide of Al Qaeda. Much like the CAP, the presence of troops interacting with the community for long periods of time was seen as a method of building trust between the locals and the U.S. forces. This method also includes less aggressive methods of engaging enemies in order to reduce the chance of civilian casualties (Fick & Nagl, 2009). Similar to CAP, at this time the use of local security forces to protect civilian centers to prevent them from joining Al Qaeda was used (Cave & Glanz, 2007). Troops were concentrated in populated areas such as Baghdad, living and operating with local forces (Kilcullen, 2009). The concurrent use of the same troops in an area also lead to a consistent memory. These troops would be able to recognize what was out of place and could indicate an IED or ambush, and would be able to recognize changes in the local atmosphere which were for or against U.S. interests (Ricks, 2006).

These strategies diverge from the conventional war which was attempted to be waged in the beginning of the conflict. Once again, U.S. officials were finding not the pitched battles that they had once been seeing or hoping for, but IED usage and sniper attacks which were clear indications of the loss of local support (Ricks, 2006). Instead of the flexibility promised earlier by Secretary Rumsfeld, coalition forces after the invasion of Iraq were stationed in forward operating bases away from the population, and conducted patrols at high speeds through problem areas (Kilcullen, 2009). This action prevented them from building relationships with the local people and did not reassure them of the U.S. involvement in rebuilding efforts. Sympathy for the population and external support expected by Rumsfeld were lacking, and this was causing even more problems as the senior leadership froze, not expecting to fight an unconventional enemy and not finding the weapons of mass destruction that they had promised were there (Ricks, 2006).

Thus, without a clear direction after the invasion, the U.S. Army once again resorted to conventional thinking, believing presence and patrolling would bring peace as they sought and found enemy forces (Ricks, 2006). This thinking lead to the belief by the locals that the Army were occupiers rather than liberators, incentivizing the insurgency as a patriotic act that saved them from humiliation, a key motivation in the Middle Eastern culture (Ricks, 2006). U.S. Army crackdowns that occurred in the late summer of 2003, while allowed the option of indirect methods, was mostly conventional in nature due to the lack of lessons learned in Vietnam and the rigidity of the institutions involved. Eventually, the repeat of heavy-handed actions on the part of the U.S. led to erosion of trust between the troops and locals (Ricks, 2006). Part of the reason these

strategies were permitted is due to the lack of any carryover lessons from Vietnam. Rather than the prize, the people of Iraq were seen more as a backdrop to a conventional fight with insurgent forces (Ricks, 2006). The military and civilian government efforts were divided and did not communicate well for the most part, and there was a lack of understanding of what kind of war was truly being fought.

A notable example of conventional war waged against the insurgent forces are the multiple attempts to pacify cities such as Fallujah. Until that point, insurgent activity was increasing in the city, and the U.S. Army was limiting its patrols to safer areas and not responding to insurgent attacks in the city. When the U.S. Marines took over, they conducted patrols as usual, unintentionally inciting heavy opposition from insurgents and locals alike (Ricks, 2006). Soon, violence resulted in the deaths of Blackwater agents after an ambush and their resulting mutilation and hanging. In retaliation, U.S. government officials decided, against Marine commander's advice, that the battle of Fallujah was conducted against insurgents with most of the tools at the Marine Corps' disposal, including gunships, air strikes, and artillery within the city (Kaplan, 2004). This battle, however, also resulted in large civilian casualties and severe backlash against the actions of the U.S. military (Barnard, 2004). These attempts served to not only damage U.S. reputation around the world, but also within the local Iraqi communities, which were important in the fight against the Insurgency.

Winning over the People

With the analysis of both conflicts in the terms of direct and indirect actions in counter-insurgency operations, the evidence suggests that what is necessary for future counter-insurgency successes is an unconventional strategy. This strategy is particularly the case when it comes to the new phase of the War on Terror, one fought on an international scale rather than one country at a time. Further, this strategy, if implemented correctly, may set a new legitimacy for future international cooperation at higher levels of politics. This could potentially help stabilize the Middle East as well as the world at large in the future.

The Hearts and Minds approach is also validated in these studies by showing that the lasting successes were due to the implementation of a local population-based approach. The need for a foreign force to connect with the citizens is paramount. With the trust of the population, insurgent forces would be unable to supply or sustain themselves with manpower, food, or munitions. The locals also provide needed information on the geography, social setting, and political climate that are all necessary for a foreign army to operate effectively there. For Vietnam, the Tet Offensive was orchestrated in part due to the lack of cooperation between the locals and U.S. forces. In Iraq, the local population were happy to be rid of Hussein, but when U.S. forces sidelined many and incited political strife, it was easy to recruit insurgent forces from them. When the CAP was

implemented in Vietnam, immediate shifts in the local atmosphere were commented on by a Marine observer: “The Vietnamese like being part of an organization which cares, and they respond well and bravely... There are sufficient men who will fight if they know the system is competent and cares” (Lewy, 1980). Similarly, if the Iraqi forces were utilized instead of fired, and political meddling was not done as a backlash against the Baathists, it is reasonable to believe that they would act in the same way because of their previous experience and participation in a stable government.

It appears apparent through the presented research that the indirect approach is more effective when considering that only with changes to a Hearts and Minds method from the direct-action pacification were forces able to gain traction in significantly reducing attacks and influence of insurgent forces. Iraq is a paramount case as it started as direct action and was molded into the unconventional approach out of necessity because of the fundamental fact that U.S. policy makers and the U.S. Army did not learn any of the lessons it was taught in Vietnam (Nagl, 2002). Richard Downie, the former Director of the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, noted that there was “no significant conceptual change to the Army’s counter-insurgency doctrine in the post-Vietnam era” despite being “well aware of deficiencies” (1998). Thus, when direct action counter-insurgency policies were failing to produce desirable results, only the indirect and local based approaches were found to have a positive outcome, noting the need for a ground up based approach rather than a top down. This is because, as noted before, insurgencies are fundamentally different from pure terrorism. They feature societal tones and often the fighters are not all die hard fanatics, participants are often pressed into service by other circumstances. As these fighters are locally based, once incentives to support insurgents ceases at the local level, the insurgency will wither and fail in that region.

What makes the indirect approach so effective and principal to the Global War on Terror is the use of the Hearts and Minds of the locals to counter the global jihad now being waged. As of now, the U.S. has no clear strategy when dealing with global insurgent groups such as ISIS, and it is impossible for the U.S. to seek to directly pacify every region in which ISIS gains a foothold. Instead, through winning the hearts and minds of the local population and establishing a legitimate regional framework, this counter-insurgency strategy may be able to be utilized in an upscale fashion. The world is now in an era of widespread conflict, global order as it was known is now fading. The hegemony of the U.S. post-Cold War and the previous systems of clear power are now called into question (Haass, 2017). The future of power within the international system is still being decided, and with the highest threat being that of the global jihad, there is a way to resolve the balance peacefully against a common foe. One of the proposed methods put forth to reinstitute world order is that of a regional based system strongly centered around the legitimacy of nations. Legitimacy will be established at the regional

level with clear leadership, and from the regional to the global in similar fashion (Haass, 2017). This method works only if this legitimacy is recognized internationally, and unilateral actions such as direct action against insurgent groups in other sovereign nations in the form of raids or drone strikes shatters this legitimacy and creates disorder (Haass, 2017). While direct action has its place, efforts in preventing the further disorder, and therefore the further expansion of jihadist disorder, should be avoided.

The indirect approach offers an opportunity for regional actors to address the local level problems that allow insurgencies to flourish. While it is not expected that every government can eliminate every insurgency or jihad, the main effort to break their global connections is possible at the local and regional level. Though these connections flow funds, weapons, and propaganda necessary for insurgencies to grow no matter the local conditions, and sanctuary areas are established for this global effort in areas that otherwise would not be as strategically important to insurgent forces (Kilcullen, 2010). Allowing insurgencies to fester in such areas allows them to feed off the local level disunity and exploit it to develop regional and global problems (Kilcullen, 2010). Disrupting efforts through an indirect counter-insurgency campaign on the regional level will counter jihadist propaganda, separate them from their local sources of power, and establish common understanding of legitimacy amongst the regional actors from which to build a new order upon.

Conclusion

As shown above, in both conflicts there were conventional and unconventional ways of viewing the conflict at hand, and both methods had influences over the actions of the U.S. military. However, upon examining the results further, one will find that Hearts and Minds approaches offered significantly more in the fight against insurgencies. Such approaches allowed a relationship between the local population and the U.S. forces, and were able to eliminate incentives to help insurgents while providing intelligence to combat them. With the case studies examined further, a clearer picture of the superiority of the Hearts and Minds approach can be drawn.

The study of these conflicts as well as the successes and failures of the strategies employed are necessary at all levels of government and military in today's turbulent world. Reevaluation must be done periodically of the actions we take as well. Although the indirect programs that had success in Vietnam eventually made their way to Iraq, evidence presented suggests that the conventional system and rigidity of thinking within institutions such as the U.S. Army as well as the U.S. government are hard to break. The examples taken of the introductory actions of the War in Iraq as well as The Insurgency show that without study, these methods and skills may deteriorate. As the world faces

future conflicts with unconventional foes, policy-makers must keep in mind the tactical level approaches that translate into strategic successes, and how to help ensure their proper employment and sustainment. This view is important on the humanitarian scale as well, as those mindful of the civilian population and their disposition may effectively shut down insurgencies from their source with far less damage than those who see conflict as one dimensional.

REFERENCES

- Barnard, A. (2004). Anger over Fallujah reaches ears of the faithful. *The Boston Globe (Boston, MA)*. http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-7838796.html?refid=easy_hf
- Bush, G. W. (2006). Peace. *Vital Speeches of the Day*, 72 (25), 710-712.
- Cave, D. & Glanz, J. (2007, Jan. 25). In a new joint U.S.-Iraqi patrol, the Americans go first.” *New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/25/world/middleeast/25haifa.html>
- Doughty, R., & Combat Studies Institute. (1979). The evolution of U.S. Army tactical doctrine, 1946-76. *Leavenworth Papers*, 1. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College.
- Downie, R. D. (1998). *Learning from conflict: the U.S. military in Vietnam, El Salvador, and the drug war*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Cassidy, R. M. (2004). Winning the war of the flea: Lessons from guerrilla warfare. *Military Review*, 84 (5), 41-46.
- Fick, N. C. & Nagl, J. A. (2009). Counterinsurgency field manual: Afghanistan edition. *Small Wars Journal*. Retrieved from <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/counterinsurgency-field-manual-afghanistan-edition>
- Ford, H. P. (1996). Thoughts engendered by Robert McNamara's *In Retrospect*: Revisiting Vietnam. *Studies in Intelligence*. Retrieved from <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/96unclass/ford.htm>
- Gordon, M. R., & Trainor, B. (2007). *Cobra II: The inside story of the invasion and occupation of Iraq*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Haass, R. (2017). *A world in disarray: American foreign policy and the crisis of the old order*. New York: Penguin Press.
- Hickman, T. R. (2005). *Combined action: Vietnam, Operation Iraqi Freedom IIA and Beyond*. Retrieved from <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a498342.pdf>
- Jenkins, B. M. (1970). *The Unchangeable War*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp. Retrieved from

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_memoranda/2006/RM6278-2.pdf

Kaplan, R. D. (2004). Five days in Fallujah. *The Atlantic*. Retrieved from <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/07/five-days-in-fallujah/303450/>

Karnow, S. (1997). *Vietnam: A history*. New York, NY: Penguin Books.

Kilcullen, D. (2009). *The accidental guerrilla: Fighting small wars in the midst of a big one*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Kilcullen, D. (2010). *Counterinsurgency*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Komer, R. (1970). *Organization and management of the new model pacification program: 1966-1969*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp. Retrieved from <https://www.rand.org/pubs/documents/D20104.html>

Kopets, K. F. (2005). The combined action program: Vietnam. *Military Review*, 82, 78-80.

Lewy, G. (1980). *America in Vietnam*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nagl, J. A. (2002). *Learning to eat soup with a knife: Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

NATO. (2009). NATO's Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs). *NATO*. Retrieved from <https://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/factsheets/omlt-factsheet.pdf>

Record, J. & Terrill, W. A. (2004). *Iraq and Vietnam: Differences, similarities, and insights*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute.

Ricks, T. (2006). *Fiasco: The American military adventure in Iraq*. New York, NY: Penguin Press.

Sheehan, N. (1989). *A bright shining lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam*. New York: Vintage Books.

United States Department of Defense. (1971). United states-Vietnam relations, 1945-1967 : Study prepared by the Department of Defense. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off.

Walt, L. W. 1970. *Strange war, strange strategy; a general's report on Vietnam*. New York, NY: Funk & Wagnalls.

Weltsch, M. D. (1991). *The future role of the combined action program* (Master's thesis). U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Retrieved from <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a243540.pdf>

Westmoreland, William C. (1976). *A soldier reports*. New York, NY: Doubleday & Company Inc.

Zedong, M., & Griffith, S. (2015). *Mao Tse-Tung on guerrilla warfare*. Hauraki Publishing.